Steganalysis via a Convolutional Neural Network using Large Convolution
  Filters for Embedding Process with Same Stego Key by Couchot, Jean-François et al.
Steganalysis via a Convolutional Neural Network
using Large Convolution Filters
for Embedding Process with Same Stego Key
Erratum note∗
Jean-Franc¸ois Couchot† Raphae¨l Couturier†‡
Christophe Guyeux† Michel Salomon†
August 2, 2016
Abstract
For the past few years, in the race between image steganography and
steganalysis, deep learning has emerged as a very promising alternative
to steganalyzer approaches based on rich image models combined with
ensemble classifiers. A key knowledge of image steganalyzer, which com-
bines relevant image features and innovative classification procedures, can
be deduced by a deep learning approach called Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNN). These kind of deep learning networks is so well-suited for
classification tasks based on the detection of variations in 2D shapes that
it is the state-of-the-art in many image recognition problems. In this arti-
cle, we design a CNN-based steganalyzer for images obtained by applying
steganography with a unique embedding key. This one is quite different
from the previous study of Qian et al. and its successor, namely Pibre et
al. The proposed architecture embeds less convolutions, with much larger
filters in the final convolutional layer, and is more general: it is able to
deal with larger images and lower payloads. For the “same embedding
key” scenario, our proposal outperforms all other steganalyzers, in par-
ticular the existing CNN-based ones, and defeats many state-of-the-art
image steganography schemes.
∗This is a corrected version of the eprint J.-F. Couchot, R. Couturier, C. Guyeux, and M.
Salomon (2016): Steganalysis via a Convolutional Neural Network using Large Convolution
Filters. Publication: eprint arXiv:1605.07946. Publication Date: 05/2016. In this version,
we used improperly prepared stego images with the same stego key, resulting in embedding
changes pretty much in the same places. This error has been pointed out by a reviewer after
submission to IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security.
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1 Introduction
The aim of steganography is to embed a private message into an innocent cover
inside a public communication channel and to finally extract the message at the
communication target. A steganographic scheme is thus composed of two algo-
rithms: the embedding one and the extraction one. The security of a stegano-
graphic scheme is evaluated according to its ability to be invisible. The less the
cover is modified to embed the hidden message, the more secure the approach
is. The slightly modified cover that contains the message is usually referred
to as stego content. Highly Undetectable steGO (HUGO) [1], WOW [2], UNI-
WARD [3], STABYLO [4], EAI-LSBM [5], and MVG [6] are some of the most
efficient instances of such schemes when the cover is an image. In all the pre-
viously aforementioned schemes, a distortion function returns a large value in a
smooth area which can be easily modeled and a small one in textured, “chaotic”
area, i.e., where there is no obvious model.
Steganalysis aims at discovering whether an object contains (or not) a hidden
message. This work focuses on image steganalysis, i.e., when cover objects
are images. It takes place into the context where the image domain is known.
Additional knowledge on the embedding algorithms and the payload can help the
steganalyzer tool. Practically speaking, most steganalyzers are twofold machine
learning tools. The objective of the first step is to capture as much information
as possible, on images it has to deal with, and through the computation of a set
of features. Many image features have been published: Rich Models (RM) have
been proposed for the spatial domain (SRM) [7, 8, 9] or for the JPEG one [10,
11]. The second step is a machine learning approach that aims at distinguishing
stego images from cover ones according to specific values of selected features.
To the best of our knowledge, tools that are based on Ensemble Classifier [12],
further denoted as EC, are considered as a state of the art steganalyzer. This
one implements a fusing step (decision function) based on a simple majority
voting between Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD) components. The two keys
of EC are the FLD and the features it embeds. A Support Vector Machine [13]
or a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)[14, 15] can serve as a suitable alternative.
Today, for many classification tasks the state-of-the-art methods belong to
deep learning [16, 17, 18], a kind of machine learning approach that has been
receiving a continuously increasing attention in the past decade. Deep learn-
ing encompasses approaches that try to automatically extract the most relevant
high-level features of the input data, to improve the learning of the targeted
task [19]. Typically, a deep learning method consists in a network / set of con-
nected processing layers, where in each layer multiple transformations (mainly
nonlinear) are performed. The different layers are usually organized in a feed-
forward manner, but recurrent networks with feedback connections are also
possible. Among the various deep learning approaches we can notice Deep Be-
lief Networks [20], Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN or ConvNet) [21], and
even, to some extent, the so-called Reservoir Computing [22, 23] (RC, like Echo
State Networks [24, 25] and Liquid State Machines [26, 27]). Furthermore,
this vision of Reservoir Computing networks as a part of the Deep Learning
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paradigm makes sense with the emergence of deep Reservoir Computing Net-
works (RCN) obtained by stacking multiple reservoirs. For example, in [28]
Jalalvand et al. applied to the MNIST image classification problem a deep
RCN of three reservoirs, each of them composed of 16K neurons, leading to
528K trainable parameters.
Let us notice that, in the case of the Reservoir Computing paradigm, various
hardware implementations have already been realized. This is due to the much
simpler learning operation that consists in a linear regression scheme, even if a
deep RCN is a deep Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [29]. In particular, sev-
eral optical reservoir computers have achieved, with good performances, various
tasks like spoken digit recognition, image classification, or channel equalization.
Such a neuromorphic computing platform has been proposed more recently for
convolutional networks by IBM using a TrueNorth chip [30], a new chip architec-
ture based on spiking neurons. The main interest of neuromorphic computing
is the energy-efficiency and the high throughput of such implementation, even
if, sometimes, the problem-solving performance is slightly lower than a state-
of-the-art computer simulation. For example, Larger et al. [31] have proposed
an optoelectronic reservoir computer able to recognize 1,000,000 spoken digits
per second almost without any error (Word Error Rate of 0.04± 0.017%), while
IBM’s chip can classify images and speech sequences at a throughput between
1,100 and 2,300 frames per second. The high-speed photonic implementation
proposed by Brunner et al. [32] further improved the performances obtained in
[31]: a lower error (WER of 0.014%) at a simultaneously highest data rate (1.1
GByte/s), showing that in comparison with an hybrid optical-electronic system,
an all-optical neuromorphic processor can offer higher throughput.
Deep learning architectures are particularly fruitful for solving classification
or recognition problems on datasets of images or videos. Therefore, since the
purpose of a steganalyzer is to perform image classification (detect if a mes-
sage is embedded or not in it), we focus our attention on convolutional neural
networks [33] based deep learning decision procedures. Such deep learning net-
works are the state-of-the-art for many classical standard datasets, like MNIST
[34], CIFAR-10 [35], or CIFAR-100 [36]. In comparison, for the MNIST prob-
lem the deep RCN proposed in [28] has achieved an error rate of 0.92 percent,
whereas the state-of-the-art method [34] (a CNN with a dropout approach in
its fully connected part performing the classification task) reaches an error rate
more than four times lower. Deep ConvNets are not only impressive with toy
datasets like MNIST, they are also very successful when dealing with real life
data such as images provided by medical imaging technologies. In this latter
field of application, deep learning appears to be a breakthrough technology for
fast and automated early detection of illnesses. Identifying signs of diabetic
retinopathy in eye images, which is a major cause of blindness and vision loss,
is a good illustration of the great positive impact of deep learning [37], since it
allows a real-time detection of eye disorders with an accuracy similar to that of
ophtalmologists. Note that the Kaggle Diabetic Retinopathy Detection compe-
tition (2015) was won by a SparseConvNet proposed by Ben Graham similar to
the state-of-the-art ones he proposed for the CIFAR tasks [35, 38].
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In fact, a CNN-based steganalyzer would allow to automatically unify feature
extraction and classification steps in one unique architecture, without any a
priori feature selection. The first experiments of a CNN architecture, using
stacked convolutional auto-encoders done by Tan and Li [39], have not reached
a level of accuracy similar to the one given by SRM+EC-based steganalyzers.
Further works [40] succeeded to have comparable performance when applied on
images of size 256×256 with large payloads: from 0.3 to 0.5 bit per pixel (bpp).
Finally, this previous work has been recently improved by Pibre et al. [41] in
the context of the scenario where stego images are always obtained by using
the same embedding key, leading to a slightly different and less complex CNN
(with fewer layers, but larger ones) able to divide by three the detection errors
for a 0.4 bpp payload. In this work we also consider the “same embedding
key” scenario but, as noticed by Pibre et al., let us emphasize that this scenario
is not recommended because embedding several messages with the same key
weakens security, since in that case embedding changes occur rather in the
same locations. Even if these successive works have shown the relevance of
CNN-based steganalysis, some limitations have still to be overcome: processing
larger images, in other domains (e.g., in JPEG one), and with other payload
values (smaller ones)
The objective of this article is to design a CNN-based steganalyzer that
further improves the performance of the previous works. Moreover, our proposal
aims at being more general and at overcoming the limitations noted previously.
More precisely, the contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Firstly, even if the proposal consists of a CNN as in the previous research
works [40] and [41], the proposed network is quite different from those
ones. On the one hand we have less convolutional layers and on the other
hand the final fully connected part doing the classification task is reduced
to its simplest form.
• Secondly, the CNN we introduce is more general, able to process larger
images, to detect steganography tools that embed messages in the spatial
and the frequency domain, and with lower payload values.
As will be shown thereafter, a key idea is the use of large convolution filters
(almost as large as the image to process) to build features giving a high level
abstraction of the input data. Thanks to this principle our deep learning network
gives very good results.
The remainder of this research work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
review existing works related to steganalyzer design. We start by giving some
details on Ensemble Classifier-based approaches and we outline the CNN-based
ones. The next section is devoted, after a brief overview of the convolutional neu-
ral networks architecture, to the description of the proposed CNN architecture.
Section 4 shows the relevance of the proposed convolutional network through
various experimental scenarios. The considered datatsets and parameter set-
tings are first described and then the results obtained with various scenarios
and payloads are introduced. In Section 5, we discuss the benefits of the pro-
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posed approach and the points that need to be further investigated. This article
ends by a conclusion section, in which the contributions are summarized and
intended future work is outlined.
2 Related works
This section presents the state-of-the-art results in steganalysis. It first recalls
the most accurate results with conventional approaches (see Section 2.1), which
is followed by deep learning based steganalysis results (see Section 2.2).
2.1 Conventional steganalysis
Let us first focus on steganalysis when the embedding scheme works in a spatial
domain. Ensemble classifier [12] and Rich Models [42] have been formerly com-
bined in [7]. This combination allows to detect the steganographic algorithm
called HUGO [1] with a detection error of 0.13 (resp. of 0.37) with a payload of
0.4 (resp. 0.1) bit per pixel on the BOSS base. Such rich models are based on
co-occurrences of noise residuals between a possibly modified pixel and its neigh-
borhood ones. However, such an approach gives exponential increasing of the
co-occurrence matrix size with respect to the neighborhood length. This issue
has been addressed in [8] where the authors enlarge neighboring residual sizes,
and project them into random directions instead of extracting co-occurrence
matrices. This projection allows to reduce the number of errors: images pos-
sibly modified by the HUGO scheme are detected with an error of 0.12 (resp
of 0.36) with a payload of 0.4 (resp. 0.1) bit per pixel on the BOSS database.
For the same set of images, the detection errors of the WOW [2] steganographic
scheme is 0.18 (resp. 0.39) with a payload of 0.4 (resp. 0.1) bit per pixel. For
the S-UNIWARD [3] scheme, the errors are respectively 0.18 and 0.40 for these
payloads. The authors of [43] have proposed to select a subset of suspicious
pixels according to the known payload. The SRM features are further extracted
and the decision is achieved by Ensemble Classifier. Thanks to this supple-
mentary knowledge, the detection errors for the WOW scheme are reduced to
0.18 and to 0.34 for payloads of 0.4 and 0.1 bpp respectively. To the best of
our knowledge, the most accurate results in spatial domain steganalysis have
been obtained in [44]. In their work, the authors modify the calculus of the
co-occurrence matrix by memorizing the maximum of the neighboring change
probabilities instead of their mean (but still across 4 residuals). With this mod-
ification, leading to a much larger scan direction, the average steganalysis errors
for the WOW scheme are reduced to 0.15 and to 0.30 for payloads of 0.4 and
0.1 bpp respectively. Moreover, the S-UNIWARD [3] scheme errors are 0.19 and
0.37 respectively for these payloads.
Projection of residuals on random directions [8] in SRM has been applied
too in the JPEG domain and is denoted as JPSRM features. With this set of
features, the authors obtained detection errors of 0.43 and 0.13 for payloads of
0.1 and 0.4 bpp respectively, with J-UNIWARD and a JPEG Quality Factor set
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to 0.75. DCTR features [45] have been introduced as an alternative to projection
in random directions. In the features calculus, projections are achieved with
DCT bases. This change of bases allows to reduce the size of the feature set
while preserving its accuracy. When applied on J-UNIWARD with 0.75 JPEG
Quality Factor, detection errors are 0.44 and 0.13 for payloads of 0.1 and 0.4 bpp
respectively. To the best of our knowledge, the most trustworthy feature set is
PHARM [11]. It is a continuation of the DCTR features in the sense that it still
takes the position of the residual into the DCT grid. Compared to this previous
set, PHARM only considers small prediction kernels to compute residuals. With
0.75 JPEG Quality Factor, detection errors are 0.42 and 0.12 for payloads 0.1
and 0.45 with PHARM features.
2.2 Deep learning based steganalysis
The design of steganalyzers based on a deep learning network, a powerful ma-
chine learning technique that has become a breakthrough technology as noted in
the previous section, has recently been investigated. More precisely, the use of
a convolutional neural network (a deep learning approach matching exactly the
underlying two-step process in classical steganalysers) to fulfill the steganal-
ysis task, has outperformed conventional methods like the ones described in
the previous paragraph. Thereafter, we will present works that have investi-
gated the use of such networks to detect if an image embeds a secret message
when using various steganographic algorithms, like HUGO [1], WOW [2], and
S-UNIWARD [3] in [40], or only the last one in [41]. For the experiments, both
works considered databases of 256 × 256 pixels grey-level images, mainly from
BOSS database, but also in [41] using an homemade database called LIRMM-
Base, which has been obtained by mixing Columbia, Dresden, Photex, and Raise
databases.
First of all, in 2015 Qian et al. [40] proposed a CNN consisting of 5 convo-
lutional layers finally producing 256 features followed by three fully connected
layers (for the classification part): two hidden layers of 128 ReLU (for Recti-
fied Linear Unit) neurons each and 2 softmax neurons in the output layer (a
more detailed overview of CNNs architecture is given in the next section). Be-
sides, this CNN does not process an input image directly, but rather works on
a 252× 252 high-pass filtered image issued by a 5× 5 kernel denoted F (0). The
experiments showed that the designed CNN was only slightly outperformed by
state-of-the-art SRM+EC-based steganalyzers. In fact, even if they obtained a
lower detection accuracy (a few percent larger errors: 3% to 4%), they empha-
sized that a CNN is a promising way for steganalysis.
Later, Pibre et al. [41] investigated this former work further and improved
the detection performance when embedding key is reused for different images.
They obtained a CNN with a different shape: fewer but larger layers, able to
reduce the detection error by more than 16% in comparison with the state-of-
the-art in case of embeddings with S-UNIWARD at 0.4 bpp. Hence, the features
are extracted by 2 layers with 64 convolution kernels in the first layer and 16 ker-
nels in the second one, using no subsampling and ReLU neurons, while in [40]
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they had 5 layers of 16 kernels each and Gaussian neurons. As a consequence,
the number of features increased dramatically from 256 to 258,064 features, even
with slightly larger kernels. The authors claim that, compared to the dramatic
reduction of the input image in 256 features in [40], using less numerous but
larger convolutional layers is one of the reasons why they obtained better re-
sults. Obviously, the huge number of features to process by the fully connected
part also needs larger hidden layers, therefore they used 1,000 ReLU neurons in
both of them. Let us also emphasize the fact that for Pibre et al. the filtering
step with F (0) is mandatory for steganalysis: without it, they observed that
none of the CNNs they tested was able to converge. They also evaluated the
classification ability of a neural network restricted to the fully connected part,
in other words a classical MLP with two hidden layers (2,000 ReLU neurons in
each one), considering as input the high-pass filtered version of an image. As
they obtained results which were only slightly worse than with a CNN (clairvoy-
ant scenario detection accuracy: 24.67% for RM+EC, 7.4% with a CNN, and
8.75% for the feedforward MLP), the benefit of the convolutional layers appears
not to be minor in comparison with the preliminary high-pass filtering. Un-
fortunatly, when considering a different key for each embedding they obtained
bad results. In fact, in that case the detection error reaches 45.31% meaning
that the CNN is not able to identify a pattern specific to stego images. We will
mostly compare our approach with this work and the conclusions drawn by it,
since we considered the same scenario than them where a single embedding key
is used. Like Pibre et al., and may be Qian et al., this choice results from the use
of the C++ implementations of steganographic algorithms for the embedding
which can be downloaded from DDE Lab Binghamton web site.
3 Principle of the method
3.1 Convolutional neural network architecture overview
A convolutional neural network consists of one or several convolutional layers,
followed by some fully connected layers of neurons like in classical multilayer
feedforward neural networks. The background idea of the convolutional layers is
to learn how to extract sets of smaller feature maps with kernels from 2D input
data, so that the final maps, processed by the fully connected part doing the
classification, give a better representation of the original data. On the one hand
it reduces the input’s dimensionality and on the other hand it automatically
finds the most suitable features to allow the CNN to fulfill the expected task.
That explains the success of convolutional neural networks in many image or
video recognition problems and why they are the current state-of-the-art in
image classification tasks.
Each convolutional layer usually produces feature maps by a three-step pro-
cess. The first step performs some filtering using K kernels leading to K new
feature maps. Therefore each kernel is applied on the existing feature maps re-
sulting from the previous convolutional layer, or on the initial two dimensional
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(a)
16 feature maps
4x4
Input image
28x28
Neurons
softmax
Convolutional layer 2Convolutional layer 1 Fully connected layer
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Predicted digit = 014x14
6 feature maps
(b)
Input image
28x28
Pooling
2x2
stride = 2
5x5
6 kernels
Neurons
ReLUstride = 1; padding = 2
Convolutional layer 1
14x14
6 feature maps
Figure 1: A convolutional neural network for the MNIST problem: global ar-
chitecture (a) and detailed view of the first convolutional layer (b).
input data in the case of the first convolutional layer, and the new feature map
is the linear combination of the filtered maps. Then, another step might reduce
each feature map thanks to a pooling operation, typically by computing the
mean or the max over p × p regions. A final step adds some nonlinearity with
the introduction of a layer of K neurons before or after the subsampling step. In
comparison with fully connected layers, convolutional layers have a lower train-
ing cost, since the weights to optimize during the learning process to obtain a
feature map are the corresponding kernel values and neuron biases. The sharing
of the kernel values by all the data points not only reduces the set of weights, but
also improves the generalization performance. As an illustration, Figure 1(a)
shows a CNN architecture for the MNIST classification problem. The MNIST
is a large database of 28× 28 pixels grey-level images obtained by normalizing
and centering handwritten digits scans. As can be seen, the CNN consists of
two convolutional layers, producing respectively 6 and 16 feature maps, and a
fully connected part reduced to the output layer with one output neuron per
possible digit value.
Similarly in other neural networks, the training (or learning) process consists
in minimizing a training error (or loss function) using an optimization algorithm
that updates the network parameters (weights and biases). A batch gradient-
based optimization algorithm is the most common choice and the Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) is very popular, particularly in the deep learning com-
munity, but more advanced techniques, such as AdaDelta or AdaGrad, might
also be considered. Obviously, in that case the well-known backpropagation
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algorithm, which allows to compute the gradient of the training error, is the
workhorse of the training process. The network parameters are usually opti-
mized until the number of updates exceeds some specified maximum values, or
when the training error reaches a given limit.
Let us now give some further details on the different steps of the proposal.
• Convolution
If we denote by Ckl the result in layer l of the convolution with the k-th
kernel defined by the weighting matrix W kl, then we have:
Ckl =
Kl−1∑
m=1
(
W kl ∗ Fm(l−1)
)
, (1)
where ∗ denotes the usual convolution product, Kl−1 is the number of
kernels in the previous layer, and Fm(l−1) the m-th final feature map
produced by the latter. For the first convolutional layer, i.e., when l = 1,
Kl−1 = K0 = 1, and F 1(l−1) = F 10 = I is the input image. The size of the
matrix filter W kl implicitly defines the size of the local area, also denoted
as receptive field in analogy with the visual system, used to compute the
value Ckl(i, j) with coordinate (i, j) in Ckl.
The size of the output of the convolution also depends on two param-
eters called stride and padding. The first one controls the overlapping
between two neighboring receptive fields in each spatial dimension (width
and height). A stride value S means that the convolution operation is ap-
plied by spatially shifting the weighing matrix W kl from S units. The sec-
ond parameter allows to pad the borders of the input feature map Fm(l−1)
or image I with zeros. Thus, let be given a stride value S, and a padding
value P , we obtain for a square input image / map Fm(l−1) an output Ckl
such that:
dim
(
Ckl
)
=
(
dim
(
Fm(l−1)
)
− dim (W kl)+ 2× P) /S + 1. (2)
In particular, to keep for Ckl the same size as the input data Fm(l−1)
(dim
(
Ckl
)
= dim
(
Fm(l−1)
)
), the stride and padding values must be set
to 1 and bdim(W kl)/2c, respectively.
• Activation function
In order to add some nonlinearity, each Ckl is processed by an activation
function fkl : R → R similar to those used in other neural networks,
considering usually a similar function fkl for the Kl filters. Various choices
are possible for fkl, such as classical sigmoid functions like the logistic
function or the hyperbolic tangent f(x) = tanh(x), a Gaussian function
defined by:
f(x) =
e−x
2
σ2
, (3)
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or the ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit) function defined by:
f(x) = max(0, x), (4)
and so on. Among them, the ReLU is a notable choice for the convolutional
layers in CNN, this one was for example chosen by Pibre et al. [41] whereas
Qian et al. [40] have chosen a less conventional Gaussian function (see
Equation (3)). When the training process is gradient-based, the activation
function must be differentiable. For each kernel a bias value bkl also allows
to control the shifting of the activation function, therefore we have Kl
additional parameters to optimize in layer l. To sum up, after this step a
map Ckl is transformed into Akl as follows:
Akl = fkl
(
Ckl + bkl
)
. (5)
• Pooling (or subsampling)
During this step, a 2D map is down-sampled by being partitioned it into
regions of pl × pl values, where each region is replaced by the mean
or the maximum of its values. A stride value might allow to control
the overlapping between neighboring regions, even if the choice of non-
overlapping ones is widespread (stride value of pl). The value of pl is
usually picked in the range of 2 to 5, according to the size of the input
data of layer l. The background idea of the pooling is twofold: reducing
the variance across the values and reducing the size of the feature map.
In the context of steganalysis, the choice of the average operation in [40] is
motivated by the low stego noise. However, despite experiments showing
that in comparison with max pooling the average operation is the best
choice, in [41] they decided to drop the pooling step considering that it
leads loss of information. This choice partly explains the huge number of
features in output of the convolutional part in the CNN proposed in [41]
and its relevance is assessed by their experiments.
Figure 1(b) precisely shows the chaining of the different steps in the case of
the CNN considered for the MNIST problem, by giving a detailed view of its
first convolutional layer. It can be seen that K1 = 6 convolution kernels of size
5 × 5 are applied with stride and padding values equal, respectively, to 1 and
2, and thus produce 6 maps having a similar size to that of the input image.
Each of these maps is then processed by a ReLU neuron (see Equation (4)),
followed by a max pooling with non-overlapping regions of 2× 2 values (stride
with value 2), finally leading to a feature map F k1 that has a size of one quarter
of the input image. Formally, each final feature map F k1 in output of the first
convolutional layer satisfies, for k = 1, . . . ,K1 = 6:
F k1 = pooling
max
(
Ak1
)
= pooling
max
(
fk1
(
Ck1 + bk1
))
(6)
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F k1 = pooling
max
fk1
 K0∑
m=1
(
W k1 ∗ Fm(l−1)
)
+ bk1
 (7)
= pooling
max
(
fk1
(
W k1 ∗ F 10 + bk1)) = pooling
max
(
fk1
(
W k1 ∗ I + bk1))
where I is the original input image.
3.2 Shape of the proposed convolutional neural network
The design of the proposed convolutional neural network, described in details
thereafter, was driven by the following considerations.
Firstly, in [40] and [41] there is no indisputable proof of the optimality of the
kernel F (0) used to first filter the input image, and which more or less operates
as an edge detection filter. In fact, in [41] the authors only experimentally
observed that, without the high-pass filter F (0), the CNNs they studied were
not able to converge, and thus they considered it as a prerequesite to application
of CNNs to steganalysis. Therefore, a question is why could his kernel not be
learned by the CNN?
Secondly, steganographic algorithms embed the secret message by modifying
pixels that are correlated and widespread throughout the whole input image.
Consequently, we think that it is better to use large convolution filters to build
features able to highlight the slight underlying modifications performed by a
steganographic algorithm. Various filter sizes can be found in the literature,
going from most common sizes 3×3 and 5×5, to 12×12 or 15×15. For example,
in the case of the MNIST problem, which deals with images of 28×28 pixels, the
filters on the first convolution layer usually have a size of 5 × 5. Larger filters
are more suited for images containing more complex information like natural
images. Overall, the choice of the filters depends on the input dataset and the
expected data correlations which will guide the classification process.
Practically, with the previous guidelines in mind and after some preliminary
experiments, we retained an architecture quite different from the ones proposed
in [40] and [41], as detailed in Figure 2. The convolution part consists of two
layers with hyperbolic tangent function as activation function. The first one
reduced to a single kernel of size 3 × 3 to achieve a first filtering in a way
similar to F (0), followed by a layer of 64 filters as large as possible with zero-
padding (a stride of 1). As we consider 512 × 512 pixels input images, the
filtered image F 11 issued by layer 1 is a 510×510 image and the 64 final feature
maps F k2, 1 ≤ k ≤ 64, given by layer 2 are of size 2 × 2, since the filters are
such that dim
(
W k2
)
= 509. Compared to [40] the convolutional part of the
proposed CNN results in the same number of features (256 features), but with
less convolutional layers as in [41] and an input image twice larger in both axes.
Note that the pooling operation is dropped in both layers. The fully connected
part is a classical neural network in its simplest form: a single output layer
of two softmax neurons. This is a major difference with the CNN designed
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64 kernels
509x509
tanh
Neurons
tanh
Neuron
Input image
512x512
Convolution layer 1 Convolution layer 2 Fully connected
layer
3x3
1 kernel
softmax2x2
Feature map
64 feature maps
510x510
Figure 2: Convolutional neural network proposed for steganalysis.
in the previous works [40, 41]. The reason why this minimal fully connected
network with no hidden layer is able to fulfill the classification task and detect
successively images with a hidden message, as shown in the next section, is the
relevance of the proposed convolution part architecture for steganalysis.
Using torch [46] as deep learning platform, the model corresponding to the
CNN described above is simply defined by:
model:add(nn.SpatialConvolutionMM(1, 1, 3, 3))
model:add(nn.Tanh())
model:add(nn.SpatialConvolutionMM(1, 64, 509, 509))
model:add(nn.Tanh())
model:add(nn.Reshape(64*4))
model:add(nn.Linear(64*4, 2))
model:add(nn.LogSoftMax())
The source code used to carry out the experimental assessment in the next
section, with some pretrained networks, is available for download from GitHub1.
4 Experimental results
In order to evaluate the detection performance of the proposed convolutional
neural network, we need cover images, embedding schemes, and to set several
parameters. Thus, we start this section by a description of the input image
datasets, the selected embedding schemes (steganographic algorithms), and the
parameters setup, in particular the parameters relative to the training method.
Then we present the steganalysis detection performance for two scenarios similar
to the ones considered in [41]. As performance metric, we chose the detection
(or classification) accuracy: the percentage of correctly classified image samples,
which will be computed on a set of images different from the ones used to train
the CNN (disjoint testing and training sets). In practice, the detection accuracy
is measured by means of the confusion matrix provided by the Torch tool.
1https://github.com/rcouturier/steganalysis_with_deep_learning.git
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4.1 Datasets and parameters setting
The experiments were performed considering images provided by two image
cover databases. The first database is the well-known BOSS one [47] (Break Our
Steganographic System), which consists of 512 × 512 grayscale images, while the
second one is the Raise database [48]. These databases are standard ones, built
to evaluate detection algorithms. Currently only three steganographic tools have
been tested and thus used to produce stego images: WOW [2], HUGO [1], and J-
UNIWARD [3]. Both former ones work in the spatial domain, whereas the latter
works in the frequency (JPEG) domain. Moreover, the different steganographic
algorithms are applied to generate stego images with two embedding payload
values: 0.4 and 0.1 bpp, using the C++ implementations available from DDE
Lab Binghamton web site2.
Compared to [41], we made more exhaustive evaluation experiments, since
Pibre et al. considered a single steganographic algorithm: S-UNIWARD, using
only the larger payload value to hide information in the stego images. It should
also be noticed that the pixel values of images are first divided by 255, and
then globally normalized using the mean and the standard deviation computed
across all the images.
We have provided a detailed description of the proposed CNN architecture
in the previous section, the only point that needs to be further discussed is the
tuning of the training (or learning) parameters. Several optimization algorithms
are available to train a neural network among which gradient-based ones are the
most common choice. In this work, we chose to apply a mini-batch stochastic
gradient descent (SGD), a very popular learning method in deep learning. This
algorithm updates the network parameters after the processing of a mini-batch
of training samples, using the gradient values computed thanks to the back-
propagation algorithm. A mini-batch gradient descent is interesting because it
usually leads to a more stable convergence. In the experiments, the training
parameters were set as follows: a mini-batch size of 100 samples, a learning rate
value of 0.5 with a 5× 10−7 decay, and a zero momentum.
To control the duration of the training process, various criteria can be consid-
ered, independently or together. For example, the training might be performed
for a fixed number of network parameters updates (or epochs), until a prede-
fined training error is reached, and so on. In this work, we retained as stopping
criteria a maximum number of training epochs. In fact, the training should
continue as long as the network generalization ability is improved and the over-
fitting avoided. According to Hinton, an early stopping approach, like the one
described in [49], is an appealing approach to monitor the training process.
From a computational complexity point of view, the cost of the training
depends on numerous parameters such as the number of input data samples to
be processed during an epoch, the number of epochs, the number of executed
operations required to obtain the network output for one input sample, and so
on. However, a key parameter is the number of network parameters (weights and
biases) to be optimized. In the case of the proposed CNN this number is huge
2http://dde.binghamton.edu/download/stego_algorithms/
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due to the 64 filters of size 509×509 to be optimized in the second convolutional
layer: 64 × (509 × 509 + 1) = 16, 581, 248 parameters. In comparison, the
first convolutional layer and the fully connected part induce a tiny number of
parameters: 1× (3×3+1) parameters for layer one and 2× (64+1) parameters
associated to the two output neurons. Fortunately, the computational cost
resulting from a such huge number of parameters to optimize is not as prohibitive
as it used to be the past, thanks to the various computing platform available
today. GPU platforms like the NVIDIA Tesla K40 GPU used in this work are
particularly interesting, as they are optimized to execute the kind of operations
used in CNNs and more generally in deep learning.
4.2 Scenarios
• Scenario 1
This scenario can be seen as a version of the clairvoyant scenario consid-
ered in [41]. On the one hand, the cover and stego images come from
the same database and on the other hand we know which steganographic
algorithm is used, just as the payload value with which the hidden mes-
sage is embedded. Thus, for the training of the network only the first
4,000 images of the BOSSBase [47] are used, whereas for the testing stage
2,000 images have been used. Recall that three different steganographic
algorithms are used: WOW [2], HUGO [1], and J-UNIWARD [3], with, in
each case, two payload values.
Figure 3(a) shows the evolution of the detection accuracy, on both training
and test images, obtained for WOW with payload of 0.4 bpp. We can see
that both curves are relatively similar: a fast convergence with a great
improvement in a few iterations (epochs). For the lower payload value of
0.1 bpp, Figure 3(b) highlights a slower training convergence, as one would
expect. We can also see that the testing accuracy exhibits a faster increase
than the training one at the beginning, reaching after large oscillations
a maximum value near iteration 50, before it slowly decreases to find a
stabilized value a little higher than 80%. Similar observations can be made
for HUGO according to Figures 3(c) and 3(d), which respectively show the
curves obtained for HUGO with a payload of 0.4 and 0.1. Finally, in the
case of J-UNIWARD we can note that even if Figures 3(e) and 3(f) show
globally the same evolution for both accuracies than in the corresponding
figures for WOW and HUGO, some slight differences appear. Firstly,
the testing accuracies reach for J-UNIWARD a lower final value, with an
accuracy above 70% for a payload of 0.1, whereas it was above 80% for the
former steganographic algorithms. Secondly, on the one hand the training
convergence is slightly faster for the largest payload, whereas it is slower
for the low payload value. We think that two reasons can explain these
observations: J-UNIWARD embeds the secret message in the frequency
domain and not in the spatial one like WOW or HUGO, and also for J-
UNIWARD the payload is defined as the percentage of modified non zero
coefficients of the DCT values.
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Figure 3: Average detection accuracy as a function of the training iterations,
and for both training and testing datasets in case of WOW, HUGO, and J-
UNIWARD steganographic schemes (with a payload α).
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One might criticize the choice we made for the training process stopping
criteria, since the testing curves in all figures clearly suggest that an early
stopping is more suitable. This is especially true when the training of
the networks is quite time consuming, as it is the case for the proposed
CNN due to the huge number of parameters to optimize. In practice,
one iteration takes approximately 40 minutes on a NVIDIA K40 GPU,
resulting in a training of more than 3 days for 110 iterations. A better
stopping strategy for the training process would allow to greatly reduce
this computation time by avoiding needless iterations. Using simultane-
ously several GPUs is also a solution to reduce the training time. However,
optimizing the training process and the corresponding computation times
was not our main concern in this study. It was rather to design a CNN
that outperforms other steganalyzers regarding the detection accuracy.
• Scenario 2
In this second scenario, we have chosen some of the previously trained
networks and we applied them on a testing dataset built from 8,000 im-
ages taken from the Raise database. Each image plays the role of cover
and stego after its processing by a steganographic algorithm (to embed a
hidden message), thus we have a testing database consisting of 16,000 im-
ages. From the image content point of view, the Raise database is rather
different from the BOSS one, therefore this scenario can be seen as an
equivalent to the cover-source mismatch scenario in [41].
To start we consider the different final CNNs obtained in scenario 1 after
training. Table 1 reports the detection accuracy observed for these net-
works on the testing database. In this table, the two first columns present,
respectively, the steganographic algorithm and the payload value used to
generate stego images for the training and testing databases. The third
column contains the iteration number during which the parameters of the
CNN were obtained, and is followed by the last three columns giving the
detection accuracy for the cover and stego images, and the total accuracy
for the whole test set. On the one hand, we can see that the accuracy
is very high for the testing stego images embedding information with a
payload of 0.4, whatever the embbeding scheme and the payload value
used for the training. In the case of the lower payload of 0.1, despite a
decrease, since it is more difficult to track the information added by the
steganographic algorithm, the accuracy remains acceptable. On the other
hand for the cover images, the detection accuracies are always worst than
for the stego ones, and particularly not so good when the training is done
with the low payload value. We think that this scenario is, nevertheless,
very interesting because stego images are in most of the cases detected,
even if there are many false negatives.
Now, if we replace each final convolution network by the best one (the
optimal CNN from the testing accuracy point of view) find throughout the
training, we obtain the results reported in Table 2. It can be noticed that
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Steganographic algorithm and payload Iteration Detection accuracy
Training Testing number Cover Stego Total
WOW 0.4 WOW 0.4 42 91.16% 99.73% 95.44%
WOW 0.1 WOW 0.1 108 59.39% 89.80% 74.59%
WOW 0.1 WOW 0.4 108 59.39% 99.56% 79.47%
HUGO 0.4 HUGO 0.4 41 94.66% 99.53% 97.09%
HUGO 0.1 HUGO 0.1 116 60.50% 88.68% 74.59%
HUGO 0.1 HUGO 0.4 116 60.50% 99.68% 80.09%
J-UNIWARD 0.4 J-UNIWARD 0.4 43 91.16% 99.73% 95.44%
J-UNIWARD 0.1 J-UNIWARD 0.1 111 52.19% 89.54% 70.86%
J-UNIWARD 0.1 J-UNIWARD 0.4 111 52.19% 99.48% 75.81%
Table 1: Steganalysis results obtained from the final CNNs produced by the
training process under scenario 1.
the best network is usually identified well before the end of the training,
as already highlighted by the figures from scenario 1. The exception is
an embedding using HUGO with a payload of 0.4. A look at the total
detection accuracy confirms that the retained CNN are almost all better
than in Table 1: the training with J-UNIWARD 0.4 is the only odd case.
We think that this case is an outlier resulting from the test data, because
we can see on Figure 3(e) that the training accuracy is not very good when
the testing one is optimal. The improvement of the total accuracy mainly
comes from the highest accuracies observed for the cover images, whereas
conversely, they are slightly lower for the stego images.
In both tables, we can see that a CNN trained with a small payload is
able to detect images embedding information with a higher payload. Ob-
viously, the lower the payload is, the more difficult the detection task is.
To sum-up, for a payload of 0.4 bpp the proposed CNN can detect stego
images with an accuracy higher than 98%, whatever the steganographic al-
gorithm chosen among WOW, HUGO, and J-UNIWARD, while it falls at
most to 73.30% for the payload of 0.1. In comparison with the experiments
presented in [41], focused on the steganographic algorithm S-UNIWARD
at 0.4 bpp, our quite different CNN is very competitive and outperforms
conventional steganalyzers using a combination of a Rich Model and En-
semble Classifier for the same embedding key scenario.
5 Discussion
Obviously, the widespread reuse of the same embedding key does not only under-
mine the security of the steganographic algorithms, but it also makes easier for a
steganalysis algorithm to detect images embedding a secret message. Moreover,
since the stego key is used to locate the embedding positions on a cover image,
a single key greatly restricts the choice of the pixels which will be modified to
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Steganographic algorithm and payload Iteration Detection accuracy
Training Testing number Cover Stego Total
WOW 0.4 WOW 0.4 34 94.96% 99.59% 97.28%
WOW 0.1 WOW 0.1 52 74.46% 81.03% 77.74%
WOW 0.1 WOW 0.4 52 74.46% 99.01% 86.73%
HUGO 0.4 HUGO 0.4 41 94.66% 99.53% 97.09%
HUGO 0.1 HUGO 0.1 54 79.90% 73.30% 76.60%
HUGO 0.1 HUGO 0.4 54 79.90% 99.28% 89.59%
J-UNIWARD 0.4 J-UNIWARD 0.4 9 85.60% 98.46% 92.03%
J-UNIWARD 0.1 J-UNIWARD 0.1 75 62.91% 83.91% 73.41%
J-UNIWARD 0.1 J-UNIWARD 0.4 75 62.91% 98.52% 80.72%
Table 2: Steganalysis results obtained from the best CNNs produced by the
training process under scenario 1.
hide the message. Steganalysis tools that exploit spatial correlation to detect
stego images, like convolutional networks, are thus favored and that explains the
obtained results. And besides, when the embedding is done considering different
keys the detection accuracy of our CNN drops dramatically and is clearly out-
performed by the conventional steganalysis scheme based on Rich Models and
Ensemble Classifier. Despite this major drawback resulting from the misuse of
embedding simulators, several remarks can be made on this work.
First of all, this study that extends the findings of the previous works on ste-
ganalysis using deep learning, strengthens the idea that this branch of machine
learning, and more particularly the convolutional neural network architecture,
is a key research direction for the design of steganalyzers. However, as the pro-
posed CNN is quite different from the ones resulting from earlier works [40, 41],
our work actually questions some assertions made in [41] on the design of con-
volutional neural networks for steganalysis. More precisely, we have shown that
the preliminary upstream filtering with F 0 of the input image before the CNN
is not mandatory, but can be replaced by a global filtering done in the first con-
volution layer, and that a huge number of features is not needed to accurately
detect stego images.
We think that the success of our proposal for the same key scenario mainly
comes from the use of large convolution filters. Indeed, such large filters build
small long-range correlation patterns and thus allow to obtain a reduced set
of well-discriminating features (256 features for 512 × 512 pixels images). The
relevance of the proposed convolutional part is further supported by the fact that
the classification task can be fulfilled with a high accuracy by a fully connected
part reduced to its simplest form consisting of the output neurons. Different
steganographic tools, working in spatial or frequency domains, can be detected
with almost no error for a payload of 0.4 bpp, but the detection ability is less
satisfactory for the lower payload value of 0.1 bpp. As expected, the lower the
payload value is, the more difficult the detection of stego images will be due
to the reduced number of modified cover pixels. As an illustration, Table 3
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Payload Steganographic algorithm
value WOW HUGO J-UNIWARD
0.1 4,714 4,872 727
0.4 23,575 23,557 3,591
Table 3: Average number of modified pixels w.r.t payloads.
summarizes the average number of pixels that have been modified, with respect
to the selected payload, on the 10,000 BOSS 512 × 512 images. For instance,
when the payload is set to α = 0.1 with HUGO, only 2,425 pixels are modified
on average in each image whereas 0.1 × 512 × 512 is 26,214. The difference is
mainly due the use of the Syndrome Treillis Code [50].
Some preliminary experiments made in the case of training-testing stego im-
ages mismatch show that some networks are able detect multiple steganographic
algorithms. For example, we have observed that a CNN trained with WOW is
able to detect images embedding data using HUGO. Therefore, it would be in-
teresting to investigate this point with other steganographic tools, in particular
tools working in the same domain.
An early stopping approach would allow to avoid overfitting and greatly
reduce the number of wasteful training epochs, and thus the computation time
spent to train a network. But the design of such a stopping strategy must
be done carefully, in order to prevent a premature stopping. The benefit of a
powerful computing platform is also important, even if after the training of a
network with a good GPU, like a K40 in our case, a less capable GPU can be
used for the testing. As an illustration, a K610 with only 192 cores and 1 GB
of memory can run all the tests presented in this article.
6 Conclusion and future work
Detecting steganographic content in images is a difficult task, which, up to now,
was mainly addressed by the use of a Rich Model with an Ensemble Classifier.
Recently, the increasing attention gained by deep learning approaches, due to
breakthrough results on various challenging classification tasks, has raised the
question of whether such an approach is relevant for the design of steganalyzers.
Beginning with the pioneer work of Qian et al., later continued by Pibre et al.,
the investigation of this question has shown that convolutional neural networks
are promising for steganalysis. In this article, we further strengthen this research
direction towards CNN-based steganalysis by the design and the very positive
evaluation of such deep neural networks. However, the conclusions drawn by
this work and the previous earlier ones are restricted by the use of a single
embedding key. A major security flaw that may occur when the user has a
bad understanding of the underlying embedding process in a steganographic
algorithm, or due to improper use of a steganography software tool.
The proposed CNN has a quite different shape compared to the ones resulting
from the earlier works, and it is able to provide high detection accuracies for
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several steganographics tools when the same stego key is reused during the
embedding process. The convolutional part of our proposal starts by a global
filtering, using a single filter, followed by a second convolutional layer that
produces a reduced set of high-level features (256 features for 512 × 512 pixels
input images) thanks to the use of large filters. The information encoded by
the final vector of features is so discriminating that the classifier part can be
reduced to only two output neurons. We finally evaluated the detection ability
of the CNN against two spatial domain steganographic schemes and a frequency
domain one. The obtained results are very encouraging, and they outperform
all the previous deep learning proposals for steganalysis. More precisely, we
designed a perfect steganalyzer for embedding payloads of 0.4 bit per pixel, and
for all the steganographic tools investigated in this article (working either in
spatial or in frequency domains). Rather interesting results have been obtained
too, albeit to a lesser extent, for a payload value of 0.1 bpp. Finally, a first step
in the design of a universal detector has been achieved here, as we are able to
detect HUGO based hidden messages even when a WOW steganographier has
been used during the training stage.
In future work, our intention is to enlarge the set of steganographiers con-
sidered during both the training and the testing stages, and to study other
frequency domains for embedding, like the wavelet one. These tools will be
mixed in various scenarios, in order to make our steganalizer as insensitive as
possible to the embedding process (universal blind detection). To speed up the
process, we will also incorporate an early stopping control element during the
learning stage. Finally, theoretical investigations will be considered, in order to
have a better understanding of the reasons why such a CNN works so well. To
do so, we will, in particular, investigate the shape of the filters found by the
convolutional neural network, and try to relate their coordinates to the chosen
steganographiers.
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